Getting it Right from the Start
Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan

This report presents the views of 38 aid agencies working on peace-building, development, and humanitarian assistance in South Sudan.

Amidst jubilant celebration, the new Republic of South Sudan entered the international stage in July 2011 albeit as one of the least developed countries in the world. The challenges and opportunities are enormous, and donors, the government, implementing agencies and most importantly the people of South Sudan have a lot at stake – but much more to gain. This paper presents ten areas for action based on the experience of NGOs operating in South Sudan and lessons learnt during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement interim period. Donors must prioritise them in the first years of the country’s independence so as to ensure the best possible results for the people of South Sudan.
Summary

Amidst jubilant celebration in July 2011, the new Republic of South Sudan entered the international stage albeit as one of the least developed countries in the world. One in eight children die before their fifth birthday, the maternal mortality rate is one of the highest in the world and more than half the population lives below the poverty line. Against a backdrop of chronic under-development, the country is acutely vulnerable to recurring conflict and climatic shocks. More than 220,000 people were displaced last year due to conflict and more than 100,000 were affected by floods; and already this year, fighting in the disputed border areas, clashes between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and militia groups, disputes over land and cattle, and attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army, have forced nearly 300,000 people from their homes. The situation is exacerbated by a continuing influx of returnees, restricted movement across the northern border, high fuel prices and regional shortages in food stocks. South Sudan is a context that challenges normal development paradigms and fits awkwardly in the humanitarian relief–recovery–post-conflict development continuum. This complexity has not always been reflected in the strategies of either donors or implementing agencies.

Following sustained international attention since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the humanitarian situation has improved. As explained by one county government authority, ‘now there are boreholes, some bomas have schools, … and basic services are starting to reach to the outlying areas.’ Many communities share the sentiment across the country.

But enormous challenges remain, and humanitarian and development actors face multiple, competing priorities: meeting emergency humanitarian needs; strengthening community resilience; addressing the underlying drivers of conflict; promoting the development of sustainable livelihoods; ensuring that humanitarian and development assistance promote equitable development; supporting the government to protect vulnerable groups; strengthening civil society; and ensuring uninterrupted service delivery while simultaneously strengthening national institutions and ultimately empowering the government to assume responsibility for meeting the needs of its citizens.

Over the coming years, donors have a window of opportunity to support the fledgling government to tackle chronic poverty and insecurity and make meaningful progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. This paper highlights ten priority areas for action that, in the view of NGOs operating in South Sudan and based on lessons learnt during the CPA interim period, must be prioritised by donors in the first years of the country’s independence so as to ensure the best possible results for the people of South Sudan.
Recommendations

1. **Balance development assistance with continued support for emergency humanitarian needs.** Recognise that there will be substantial humanitarian needs for years to come, and ensure that humanitarian response capacity is adequately resourced. Continue to support international humanitarian response institutions; strengthen efforts to build government emergency preparedness and disaster management capacity; explore innovative mechanisms for enabling faster, more effective response; and support initiatives aimed at strengthening the ability of communities to prevent, mitigate and recover from humanitarian crises.

2. **Understand conflict dynamics.** Commit to rigorous and systematic conflict analysis and to adapting development strategies accordingly. Ensure that funding strategies reflect the criticality of the link between security and development – meaning that adequate funding must be provided for humanitarian protection programmes, basic services and development, and security sector reform. In decisions regarding the geographical allocation of international and national security personnel, ensure that the need to protect community livelihoods and food security is prioritised.

3. **Involve communities and strengthen civil society.** Provide more substantial support for initiatives that promote community participation in humanitarian and development assistance; support initiatives aimed at strengthening civil society; and facilitate access by national NGOs and civil society organisations to international funds.

4. **Ensure an equitable distribution of assistance.** Ensure that international assistance is appropriately targeted so as to promote equitable social and economic development. Avoid unintentional exclusionary effects when determining geographic focus areas, and support the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to develop a system for a more equitable and transparent distribution of wealth between and within the states.

5. **Prioritise the most vulnerable and ensure social protection.** Support the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) to develop and introduce social protection policies, and build the capacity of key ministries in the design and implementation of social protection programs. Advocate with the GoSS to increase its budget allocation to the social sectors, ensure that donor support for social protection does not result in a reduction of support for essential services, and provide greater support for programs targeting vulnerable groups.
6. **Promote pro-poor, sustainable livelihoods.** Provide more substantial support for small-scale agricultural (and pastoral/piscicultural) production, and better targeted livelihoods support in areas hosting large numbers of returnees. Promote access to and ownership of land for returnees, internally displaced persons and vulnerable groups, and provide technical support for the Sudan/South Sudan border cooperation policy. And recognising that livelihoods will be constrained so long as communities continue to live in fear of violence, continue to support initiatives aimed at improving local security.

7. **Strengthen government capacity, from the bottom up.** Support the GoSS in its commitment to decentralisation, provide more targeted support for initiatives aimed at addressing key capacity gaps at the county level, and continue to explore innovative solutions for increasing the number of qualified staff throughout the country.

8. **Allow sufficient time for transition towards government management of international aid.** Build government capacity to manage aid funds, and build civil society capacity to engage in the budget development and monitoring process. Support the GoSS to establish benchmarks for determining whether national systems and institutions provide sufficient assurance that government-managed aid brings maximum possible benefit to the people of South Sudan; ensure that funding mechanisms are designed so as to facilitate transition to government management; and ensure that there is no interruption in basic service delivery while new funding mechanisms are being designed. And as a critical part of the transition process, support the GoSS to develop and implement an appropriate regulatory framework to facilitate the work of NGOs.

9. **Provide timely, predictable funds.** Recognise that effective response requires a range of funding mechanisms, and that this should include substantial bilateral funds channelled directly to implementing agencies. Ensure that key issues experienced with the Common Humanitarian Fund (the delayed disbursement of funds, short implementation periods and lack of synchronisation with the seasonal calendar) are addressed in the design of any new such fund for South Sudan; that all new pooled funds are designed so as to facilitate timely response; and that South Sudan’s new aid architecture includes long-term (multi-year) development funding.

10. **Ensure integrated programming.** Ensure that funding mechanisms are broad and flexible enough to support holistic, integrated programming – meaning programming that is based on needs assessments, multi-sectoral, and that allows for appropriate transition from relief to development. Recognise that this will require substantially improved donor coordination: between donors operating in different sectors, and between humanitarian relief and development donors (including between humanitarian and development offices within the same donor).
Introduction

On 9 July, millions of South Sudanese danced and sang in the streets as they celebrated their independence. The sense of excitement and promise was, and still is, palpable. As described by one national NGO staff, independence ‘means that my children … can be whatever they want. … Before there was nothing, now we have a future.’ And there is good reason for optimism. The agricultural potential of South Sudan is vast, as are the oil and mineral reserves; there are large numbers of highly educated returnees; and South Sudanese throughout the country feel for the first time that the future is in their hands and are eager to play a part in building the nation.

But the Republic of South Sudan enters the international stage as one of the least developed countries in the world. Against a backdrop of chronic under-development, it is acutely vulnerable to recurring conflict and climatic shocks. Tensions in the northern border areas remain unresolved; inter/intra communal conflict continues to flare; and the resulting displacement undermines livelihoods and food security. South Sudan is a complex context straddling the humanitarian-development paradigm. The country does not fit neatly in the humanitarian relief–recovery–post-conflict development continuum. This complexity has not always been reflected in the strategies of either donors or implementing agencies.

Humanitarian and development actors face multiple, competing priorities: meeting the humanitarian needs of crisis-affected populations; strengthening community resilience; addressing the underlying drivers of conflict; promoting the development of sustainable livelihoods; ensuring that humanitarian and development assistance promote equitable development; supporting the government to protect vulnerable groups; strengthening civil society; and ensuring uninterrupted service delivery while simultaneously strengthening national institutions and ultimately empowering the government to assume responsibility for meeting the needs of its citizens.

The excitement following the birth of the nation is hard to overstate, but the disillusionment following a failure to deliver would be equally severe. The government and its international partners cannot afford to fail.

Over the coming years, donors have a window of opportunity to support the fledgling government to tackle chronic poverty and insecurity and make meaningful progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This paper highlights ten priority areas for action based on the experience of NGOs operating in South Sudan and lessons learnt during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) interim period. Donors must prioritise them in the first years of the country’s independence so as to ensure the best possible results for the people of South Sudan.
Support emergency humanitarian needs

Six years on from the signing of the CPA, much of South Sudan remains a humanitarian crisis. This is due in part to chronic under-development following decades of war, in part to ongoing conflict, and in part to the frequent recurrence of droughts and floods.

The statistics are well known. One in eight children die before their fifth birthday, less than half the population has access to safe drinking water and more than half the population live below the poverty line. The maternal mortality rate is among the highest in the world, with one in seven women dying from pregnancy-related causes and a 15 year old girl more likely to die in childbirth than finish school. More than 80 per cent of women are illiterate, less than 20 per cent of the population will ever visit a health facility and fewer than two in ten children are fully vaccinated against disease. Last year nearly half the population required food assistance or a food-related intervention at some point during the year.

Droughts, floods and conflict compound the problem. More than 220,000 people were forced from their homes last year as a result of conflict and more than 100,000 were affected by seasonal flooding – and most required some form of humanitarian assistance. Already this year, inter/intra-communal conflict, fighting in the disputed Abyei region, political opposition from armed groups, and attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have resulted in the displacement of an estimated 274,000 people in South Sudan. Women and girls are disproportionately affected, with particular needs that are easily overlooked when resources are stretched. The situation is exacerbated by restricted movement across the northern border, high fuel prices, a continuing influx of returnees and regional shortages in food stocks due to the drought across the Horn of Africa. All of this contributes to a substantial increase in food prices - and the likelihood that the 2.4m people who last year suffered moderate food insecurity could be pushed into severe food insecurity without substantial humanitarian assistance.

In the aftermath of independence, a number of donors are looking to make a shift from humanitarian to development assistance. Such a shift must not come at the cost of attention to immediate humanitarian needs. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has only recently scaled-up and still has insufficient regional presence to reach all of the states, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management is less than a year old, the response capacity of implementing agencies is poorly spread across the states, and community resilience has been weakened by decades of war. The potential for humanitarian need to suddenly outstrip available resources has been highlighted already this year. As one NGO staff said following the mass displacement from Abyei in May, ‘look how much trouble we’ve had coping with Abyei. Imagine how we’d go
responding to a worst case scenario of 200,000 – 300,000 people displaced or a sudden influx of returns from the north? If we started to see really serious violence in Unity State or elsewhere, we’d be seriously stretched.’

Recommendations

• Recognise that there will be significant humanitarian needs, and continued need for emergency response, for years to come. The capacity of the international community to adequately respond must be maintained, and should be resourced via funding that is fast and flexible enough to allow rapid, effective humanitarian response. This will be best achieved through substantial humanitarian funding channelled bilaterally to implementing agencies, together with an adequately resourced Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) for South Sudan (detailed recommendations regarding the CHF are described in section nine).

• Continue to support international humanitarian response institutions, including OCHA and the clusters (with a focus on strengthening coordination capacity at the state level); and strengthen efforts to build the emergency preparedness and disaster management capacity of government institutions at national, state and local level. This should include training for a range of government actors (such as county health departments) in contingency planning, as well as support for local government to develop assessment and coordination mechanisms so as to enable appropriate, government-led disaster response.

• Continue to explore innovative mechanisms for enabling faster, more effective humanitarian response. In addition to continued support for inter-agency planning, this could include the pre-positioning of emergency response funds or the signing of contingency agreements with implementing partners (as some donors have done); or the identification of sectoral emergency response leads in each state; or more substantial support for initiatives aimed at developing the response capacity of national NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs).

• Provide more substantial support for initiatives aimed at strengthening the ability of communities to prevent, mitigate and recover from humanitarian crises. Initiatives should focus on strengthening existing community structures – for example by supporting community leaders to develop contingency plans, or supporting community groups to play a role in raising awareness regarding natural hazards – and particular attention should be paid to facilitating the participation of women, children and vulnerable groups.
Understand the conflict dynamics

Humanitarian and development efforts in South Sudan must be based on a realistic, nuanced and well-informed understanding of the evolving context. This includes an understanding of the drivers and dynamics of conflict, and an appreciation of the importance of the link between security and development.

In South Sudan, drivers of conflict vary across the country and over time, but include lack of employment opportunities for youth; competition over natural resources; cattle-raiding; land disputes (including ‘land grabbing’ by powerful individuals and large-scale land acquisition by private investors); ongoing Sudan/South Sudan tensions; abuses by armed groups; conflict between the SPLA and rebel groups; and spill-over from neighbouring (regional) conflicts. The corrosive impact of these conflict drivers is exacerbated by the fact that the role traditionally played by tribal chiefs in non-violent conflict resolution has been eroded by displacement, urbanisation and the proliferation of small arms.

A range of tools have been developed for the purpose of assisting humanitarian and development actors to analyse and address the drivers and dynamics of conflict. But evaluations have found that in South Sudan, such tools are not being used to their full potential. Last year’s multi-donor evaluation, Aiding the Peace, found that very few donors had ‘explicitly and regularly referred to conflict analyses in programme planning’, and the government’s recent ‘Survey for Monitoring the Implementation of the Fragile States Principles’ found that a number of donors expressed doubts as to whether ‘we fully understand the current context’. The use of gender-analysis in understanding the causes and drivers of conflict is even less likely.

A lack of attention to the drivers and dynamics of conflict has a number of possible implications: a premature shift to post-conflict recovery to the detriment of basic service delivery; supply-driven, short-term humanitarian aid that fails to build community resilience and can in fact exacerbate vulnerability; poorly-designed programs that address the symptoms but not the underlying causes of conflict; a focus on economic development without due attention to related political and security priorities; and inadequate attention to regional security threats such as the LRA or to developing the professionalism of the state’s own security forces.

In addition to the under-utilisation of conflict analysis tools, there has also been an under-appreciation of the link between security and development. Insecurity disrupts cultivation, limits movement and trade, restricts access to markets, schools and healthcare and exacerbates vulnerabilities – with women and children almost always disproportionately affected. One example of this is in the LRA affected areas of Western Equatoria. According to OCHA, in 2010 LRA attacks accounted for only a minimal number of civilian casualties, but 20 per cent of displacement in South Sudan during that year, with 45,000
persons displaced. All this took place in a State which should have been the bread basket of Southern Sudan. Instead, this State became one of 3 states to become more food insecure in the first half of 2010.

As noted in this year’s *World Development Report*, “in highly violent societies, … everyday experiences, such as going to school, to work, or to market, become occasions for fear. People hesitate to build houses or invest in small businesses because they can be destroyed in a moment.” Thus in the absence of adequate attention to mitigating security threats, addressing root causes of conflict including inequitable development, and to the professionalization of the security sector, gains in other sectors can easily be undermined.

**Recommendations**

- Commit to rigorous and systematic conflict analysis that considers not only the prevailing political and security conditions but also the root causes of conflict, and to regularly adapting development strategies on the basis of such analysis. Conflict analysis should be conducted periodically as well as in response to changes in context; and information should be geographically disaggregated so as to take account of factors that vary between states, counties and even local communities. Conflict analysis must also be gender-sensitive, meaning that the particular impact of violence and displacement on women and men (such as exacerbated inequalities in gender relations) must be taken into account and reflected in program design.

- Ensure that funding strategies reflect the criticality of the link between security and development. This means that, with a view to protecting communities from violence, donors must ensure adequate funds for humanitarian protection programs and staff, basic services and development, as well as for security sector reform. For much of the past six years the development of South Sudan’s fledgling security sector has been slow with inadequate progress in the development of effective community-oriented policing and the strengthening of the justice system (both formal and traditional). This lack of progress must be reversed so as to ensure that development gains in other areas are not undermined.

- In decisions regarding the geographical allocation of South Sudanese and international security personnel, prioritise the need to protect community livelihoods and food security. This means that security threats must be assessed according to their impact on communities such as restricted access to livelihoods and basic services, and numbers displaced, and not just the number of fatalities involved. Particular attention must be paid to the presence of rebel commanders or armed groups that cause widespread displacement and detrimentally impact upon food security in areas with high agricultural potential – including in particular the LRA.
The importance of fostering the participation of local communities and a range of CSOs including women’s, youth, and faith-based and church groups in the development of South Sudan cannot be overstated. Community participation enhances the relevance and sustainability of development initiatives; while a strong civil society facilitates good governance by increasing the likelihood of local authorities being held accountable to the people.

Those best able to determine what is needed in order to strengthen communities are almost always the communities themselves, and their involvement helps ensure community ownership of development initiatives. Experience in South Sudan has shown time and again that without this, results are difficult to sustain. Agencies supporting the management of community water resources, for example, have found that without community involvement in choosing the site for water points, the selection of water management committee members and the establishment of rules for maintenance and the payment of user-fees, the likelihood of water resources being maintained by communities is substantially reduced. This is basic development good practice, but is often sidelined in the interests of meeting donor commitments in limited timeframes where access to communities is restricted due to long rainy seasons and poor infrastructure.

It’s not just about promoting community ownership. Donors and implementing agencies have acknowledged that throughout years of humanitarian and development assistance, adequate attention has not always been paid to the development of local capacities — and

Emergency Response Team – Old Fangak, Jonglei State, October 2010, © Mediar

3 Involve communities and strengthen civil society
anecdotal evidence suggests that in some cases this may have undermined the capacity and desire of local communities to contribute to their own development. A frustration commonly expressed by field staff, for example, is that there is an expectation on the part of communities that they will receive incentives in exchange for their participation. As explained by an NGO staff in Upper Nile, ‘some NGOs … dig the latrines and then just give them to the community. After that it’s hard to convince the community to do the digging themselves’.\textsuperscript{19} Countering this expectation requires a consistent, inter-agency approach.

While some communities have become accustomed to expecting services from NGOs at no cost to themselves, this is not the case vis-à-vis local authorities. In South Sudan many communities have no experience with government service delivery, and thus are unaccustomed to expecting let alone demanding services from government. The implications of this are exacerbated by the fact that decades of war and the resulting disruption to communities has in many areas left behind a civil society that has limited capacity to collectively organise and hold government to account. The result is a serious absence of formal or informal civil society oversight – or ‘downward accountability’ – of government actors.

The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that it is extremely difficult for national NGOs or CSOs in South Sudan to access international donor funds. This is due to a range of factors including lack of access to information on funding opportunities, cumbersome application procedures, a requirement for audited accounts, a requirement that operational support costs be shared between multiple grants (when many national NGOs/CSOs have only one donor), or minimum grant sizes that are too large for most national NGOs/CSOs to manage.\textsuperscript{20} The exclusion of civil society from development assistance runs counter to the commitment made by donors in the Accra Agenda for Action to ‘work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximises their contributions to development’\textsuperscript{21} – and limits the ability of national NGOs/CSOs to play a role both in service delivery and in promoting/demanding good governance.

\textbf{Recommendations}

- Provide more substantial support for initiatives that promote community participation in both humanitarian and development assistance. ‘Community driven development’ models have in some cases proved successful in achieving sustainable results – however to maximise the chances of success such initiatives should be closely monitored, and where possible linked to government planning processes. Whatever the model used, grant agreements should require (and be long enough to allow for) the genuine participation of men, women and children, and should be flexible enough to be adapted in response to community input.
• Provide more substantial support for efforts aimed at strengthening civil society including women’s, youth and faith-based groups. This should include financial support for CSOs, and training for communities and CSOs on the roles and responsibilities of government and on strategies for engaging with local authorities. The South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013 (SSDP) contains a commitment to training civil society on good governance, and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) should be supported to fulfil this commitment.

• Ensure that South Sudan’s new aid architecture facilitates national NGO/CSO access to international funds. This requires attention to the factors currently precluding access (financial reporting requirements, limited capacity to cost-share, grant sizes, etc); and attention to building the capacity of national NGOs/CSOs to submit competitive proposals and meet donor requirements including properly accounting for funds received.
4 Ensure an equitable distribution of assistance

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* ('Fragile States Principles') recognise the need to ‘avoid pockets of exclusion’ and ‘aid orphans’ – ‘states [or geographical regions within a country] where … few international actors are engaged and aid volumes are low.’

Throughout the CPA interim period, much of the focus of development in South Sudan has been in Juba, and to a lesser extent, the ten state capitals. As a result, today there is significant and growing inequality: between Juba and the rest of the country; between urban and rural areas; within urban areas (such as between squatter areas and wealthier neighbourhoods); and between and within the states. In Eastern Equatoria, for example, Magwi county receives considerable international support, in part because the local leadership is well educated and adept at advocating for support; while the counties of Lopa/Lafon and Kopoeta North, with comparable needs but harder to reach, receive little. Such an approach can lead to increased marginalisation, often of the poorest and most vulnerable, and risks reinforcing historical grievances.

The issue is exacerbated by the GoSS’s own mechanism for the distribution of wealth. The *Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan* calls for an equitable distribution among the Southern Sudanese states and local governments but because of the unreliability of population data, funds allocated for state and county capital expenditure (‘block transfers’) are split equally (not equitably) between each of the states and then again between the counties. Thus Jonglei, for example, gets roughly a third as much per capita as Western Bahr el Gazal, while having to provide for a food insecure population nearly six times as large. Such an approach runs counter to the development model envisaged not only in the *Transitional Constitution* but also by the CPA, which recognised the ‘historical injustices and inequality in development between the different regions of the Sudan’, and called for wealth to be shared without discrimination on any grounds.

**Recommendations**

- Ensure that international assistance is appropriately targeted so as to promote equitable social and economic development. In determining geographic focus areas, seek to avoid unintentional exclusionary effects – such as a disproportionate focus on easily accessible areas, or a focus on states or counties with strong leadership or better infrastructure. This requires substantially improved donor coordination (including joint assessment and monitoring), as well as
frequent travel outside the capital for monitoring and assessment purposes. The GoSS should also be supported to develop its own coordination capacity – for example through programs such as the UNDP’s Local Government Recovery Program.

- Support the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) to develop a system for a more equitable (and transparent) distribution of wealth between and within the states. At a minimum, the allocation of block transfers to the counties should take into account county populations, together with other criteria such as poverty levels, the availability of services and population density. Donors should ensure that in the lead up to the next census, the South Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation is supported to provide the government with ‘up-to-date and accurate information with which to plan the efficient and equitable allocation of public resources’²⁹ – as envisaged in the SSDP.
Prioritise the most vulnerable and ensure social protection

South Sudanese live in an environment in which livelihoods are constantly under threat: by climatic shocks, by conflict, and by a fluctuating global economy. Income shocks over the past year have been particularly harsh, and more than three million people throughout the country are either moderately or severely food insecure. Thousands of households engage in harmful coping strategies – including reducing food intake, selling productive assets, taking children out of school, and going into debt. With food prices continuing to rise, an ongoing influx of returnees and security continuing to deteriorate, food security levels could easily decline further – pushing more and more households towards these and other harmful coping strategies.

Deteriorating food security can lead to increased violence and insecurity, and exacerbates vulnerabilities. At the community level, food insecurity increases competition for scarce resources; and at the
household level, men who are frustrated by their inability to provide for their families are more likely to resort to violence. Women are exposed to further violence as they take on alternative livelihood activities, and the vulnerability of children and other vulnerable groups is exacerbated as spending on essential services is reduced.

In a context of heightened vulnerability, programs targeting groups with particular needs (separated and unaccompanied children, persons with severe medical conditions, persons with HIV/AIDS, survivors of gender-based violence, single heads of households, widows, and the elderly and disabled) are all the more important. But in South Sudan such programs are scarcely available. Recent interviews carried out by the South Sudan protection cluster found that services to support separated and unaccompanied children were available in just one third of areas surveyed, while services to support other vulnerable groups were even scarcer.

With a view to ‘empowering vulnerable groups and providing safeguards for people living in extreme poverty’, the SSDP states that ‘core policies on social protection … are being developed’. Specifically, the GoSS aims to provide a ‘nation-wide child benefit cash transfer’ to households with children under six years; and to ‘have a comprehensive social protection system in place’ by 2013.

Social protection (defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development as ‘policies and actions which enhance the capacity of poor and vulnerable people to escape from poverty and enable them to better manage risks and shocks … [including] social insurance, social transfers and minimum labour standards’) can play a critical role in protecting household assets in times of shock; and in more profitable times, empowering households to engage in riskier but more profitable activity. It can also leverage gains made in the social sectors by empowering poor men and women to access services – for example by enabling poor households to purchase books and uniforms so as to send their children to school, and to pay the transportation costs necessary to access healthcare. And perhaps most importantly, social protection can promote gender equity – because in times of income shock the burden of reduced household spending is disproportionately borne by women. More needs to be done to understand traditional social protection mechanisms and how external actors can support such approaches.

But social protection is not always effective in meeting the needs of the most vulnerable – and in the design and implementation of social protection policies for South Sudan it will be critical that lessons learnt from social protection programming around the world be taken into account. In particular:

- Social protection strategies must be gender-sensitive, meaning that they must be informed by a robust analysis of gender relations, and ensure that increased household income is effectively allocated and results in a strengthened position for women.
• Targeting strategies must be based on a sound poverty analysis and clearly matched to the purpose of social protection – meaning that if the purpose of social protection is to increase food security, then it will be appropriate to target the most food insecure households, whereas if the objective is to enable future generations to break free from poverty, then social assistance such as child benefits will be most appropriate.

• Institutional capacity, across the range of ministries that have a role in the design and implementation of social protection programs, is critical to success. Also important are clearly defined ministerial responsibilities, inter-ministerial coordination, and an implementation mechanism that allows for delivery by the ‘lowest possible administrative levels’.41

• The issue of fiscal sustainability must be analysed at the outset when determining the scale and scope of social protection programs. Experience shows that sustainable financing will likely be a long term process requiring reallocation of domestic resources, domestic revenue generation and well-coordinated international aid.42

It is important to note that even the best designed social protection programs do not replace the need for pro-poor social and economic policies, nor for appropriate investment in the social sectors. Nor do they replace the need for specific interventions promoting the rights of vulnerable groups; nor for livelihoods promotion programs. Experience shows that without complementary livelihoods activities, social assistance is unlikely to lift people out of poverty;43 and without interventions aimed at the promotion of rights, can inadvertently exacerbate stigmatization.44

Recommendations

• Support the GoSS to develop and introduce appropriate social protection policies and strengthen traditional mechanisms where they exist. Consideration should be given to a range of instruments including child and disability benefits, and cash transfers targeting those most vulnerable to food insecurity. Policies must be informed by a sound poverty analysis, an understanding of the purpose of social protection in South Sudan, and lessons learned from social protection programming elsewhere. Funding must be long-term, predictable and aligned with national policies, and particular attention must be paid to ensuring domestic fiscal sustainability.

• Ensure that support for social protection is accompanied by appropriate capacity building for key ministries (MoFEP, Health, Education, and Gender, Child and Social Welfare) in the design and delivery of social protection programs; and support the GoSS to clearly define ministerial responsibilities and to establish a decentralised delivery mechanism.
• Advocate with the GoSS to increase its budget allocation to the social sectors (the current allocation is well below regional norms\textsuperscript{45}), and ensure that donor support for social protection does not result in a corresponding reduction of support for essential services.

• Provide more substantial financial and technical support to programs targeting vulnerable groups, including separated and unaccompanied children, the disabled and the elderly, single-headed households, widows and survivors of gender-based violence – noting that such programs are often most successful when designed and implemented in partnership with government ministries and when they provide an integrated package of services (such as livelihoods support, shelter and education).\textsuperscript{46}
Support pro-poor, sustainable livelihoods

Despite the richness of South Sudan’s natural resource base, the vast majority of the population relies primarily on subsistence agro/pastoralism. The formal economy, which accounts for almost all of the government’s revenue but employs only a small proportion of the population, is overwhelmingly dependent on oil resources, which are expected to be in decline by 2015. Just four per cent of arable land is cultivated, the production of livestock and fish is just a fraction of the potential, and interstate trade and international exports are minimal. The scope for profitable livelihoods throughout the country is enormous; the challenge is to ensure that the available resources are exploited in a manner that leads to improved food security and a reduction in poverty across South Sudan.

The livelihoods profiles of the different states differ widely, from an almost exclusive reliance on agriculture in the southwest, to the pure pastoralism of the southeast. Livelihoods are constrained by different factors in different regions, but across the country a number of key challenges can be identified:

- The impact of insecurity on almost every aspect of life in South Sudan has been highlighted earlier in this paper, but it is essential to note here too the inextricability of the link between security and livelihoods. Insecurity restricts access to markets, water sources, fields and grazing areas; disrupts seasonal labour migration; and is often associated with the theft and/or destruction of crops and livestock. As explained by one man in Yambio county, Western Equatoria, ‘security is a condition for everything’.

- A significant majority of returnees have no access to cultivatable land and do not own livestock. Many rely on begging, borrowing or the sale of household assets, placing enormous strain on host communities. Relatively little attention has been paid to medium to long-term reintegration issues (including problems associated with access to land for returnees, particularly female-headed households), and returnees who have received livelihood support have often been provided only with agricultural inputs – despite the relatively small number with access to land, and the fact that many have lived for years in urban settings and have a variety of potentially exploitable, marketable skills.

- In the months leading up to independence, restricted movement substantially affected livelihoods activity across the Sudan/South Sudan border. Traders, farmers and nomadic tribes from Sudan were prevented from exchanging commodities with South Sudan and from accessing lands traditionally used for cultivation and grazing; and South Sudanese were prevented from migrating north for seasonal labour and from selling fish and livestock to traders from Sudan. This affected incomes in South Sudan, increased the
cost of production in Sudan, and resulted in a substantial increase in food prices.\textsuperscript{53}

- Finally, there is a near complete absence of value-adding equipment or technology – meaning that the potential for small-scale commercial agriculture is virtually untapped. Wheat flour, maize flour, sugar and palm oil, available in abundance in raw form, are imported from neighbouring countries. Western Equatoria, which could be feeding the rest of the country but instead imports flour, rice and fruit and vegetable products from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, is a case in point.

**Box 1: Access to markets in the ‘Green Belt’**

In Western Equatoria, mangos lie rotting on the ground. As one farmer explains, ‘there’s no market for them here. If someone knew someone who could come and buy them and knew where to sell them, they could do it.’ The chairman of the Yambio Farmer’s Association (YAFA) says ‘there’s no way to carry [the mangos] to another place. How would you keep them well to reach that place?’ He says that YAFA has a plan to buy a juicing machine, but that the plan ‘depends on money’. In the meantime, traders import juice packs from Uganda and sell them in Yambio for 12 Sudanese pounds – enough for one family to buy meat for a week.

Access to credit is a commonly-cited problem. There’s a micro-finance institution in Yambio, but it doesn’t give loans to farmers, which are regarded as long-term loans. YAFA recently sought a loan to purchase a truck, but the application was rejected. The truck would have enabled YAFA to transport produce to Juba and elsewhere – charging members only a small fee for maintenance and fuel costs.

The point is that while fruits, vegetables and grains grow in abundance, almost every point of the ‘value chain’ (connecting producer to consumer) is under-developed. Farmers can’t sell their crops locally because there’s no market, and they can’t afford to send them to the markets because they don’t have enough to make it worth their while to pay for transport. They can’t produce any more because they can’t afford to hire a tractor to cultivate larger areas; and they can’t get a loan to hire the tractor because loans aren’t available to farmers. And even if you could get around all this, the produce probably wouldn’t be competitive anyway because of substandard processing and packaging.\textsuperscript{55}

**Recommendations**

- Provide more substantial support for small-scale agricultural (and pastoral/piscicultural) production. In addition to seeds and tools, focus on strengthening the private sector (for example through support to seed multiplication and bulking centres) so that farmers can access seeds and tools through functioning markets. Other priorities include training in improved farming, fishing and animal husbandry techniques; agricultural extension services; processing and packaging inputs and technology; and access to credit. Assistance should in all cases be pro-poor (meaning that
interventions must support, not exclude, smallholder production); must prioritise vulnerable groups; and must be designed so as to ensure the equitable participation of both women and men.

• Provide more substantial and better targeted livelihoods support in areas hosting large numbers of returnees based on an analysis of the different needs of women and men. Seeds, tools and training are appropriate for those with access to land, but for the landless majority, more innovative approaches are required. Returnees should be supported to productively engage in local economies, utilising skills and experiences acquired during the war and in a manner appropriate to their new (often urban) environments. In all cases livelihoods support should be context-specific, based on market assessments, and relevant to the skills and assets already possessed by beneficiaries.

• Scale-up efforts to promote access to and ownership of land for returnees, internally displaced persons and vulnerable groups. This should include support for: the establishment of offices of the South Sudan Land Commission in each state; the development of county land authorities and payam land councils; the development of policies and procedures for restitution and compensation in relation to land taken during the civil war; and the establishment (or enhancement) of community-based dispute resolution initiatives.

• Provide technical support for the Sudan/South Sudan border cooperation policy – ensuring the free movement of persons and goods for purposes of economic and social interaction. Specifically, support the GoSS in its provisional commitment to ensure that decisions regarding border management are taken ‘at the level nearest to their implementation’, and that ‘the views and interests of the various stakeholders including … community actors [are] taken into account’ in the management of border issues.56

• Recognising that livelihoods will be seriously constrained so long as communities continue to live in fear of violence, continue to support initiatives aimed at improving local security. These should include local peacebuilding initiatives (implemented through established community structures), continued support for the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, and programs to support and promote good governance, community-oriented policing and access to both formal and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms – in all cases based on community-identified needs.
Strengthen government capacity – from the bottom up

The *Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan* contains a commitment to the ‘decentralisation of decision-making in regard to development, service delivery and good governance’, and the *Local Government Act 2009* devolves responsibility for the provision of basic services to ‘local government councils’. For most South Sudanese, their impressions of government are defined by their interaction with, and the quality of services provided by, county governments – and these interactions are thus fundamental to building the legitimacy of the new government.

Despite this for much of the CPA interim period, efforts to build government capacity have focused on central government institutions. The GoSS’ Medium-Term Capacity Building Strategy acknowledges that there is ‘no decentralised policy for capacity development’, that ‘government revenue has not reached the state and county levels in a sustained, efficient manner’, and that ‘links between levels of government must be further developed … through a redistribution of human and material resources away from the centre and towards institutions in the states.’ Recent months have seen the beginnings of a shift in focus (USAID’s strengthening governance project, and the Norwegian initiative to bring in civil servants from neighbouring countries to train/mentor South Sudanese civil servants, provide positive examples), but there is a long way to go before local government (county) councils can be expected to assume full responsibility for the provision of basic services.

The task of building government capacity at the county level faces enormous challenges. Many county departments lack their own office space, many are reliant either on commercial buses or rides from NGOs for transportation, and few have access to adequate communications. Many have no access to computers, few have internet access, and the few who do have internet access may not know how to use it. In many cases county authorities don’t control their own finances, making it difficult for them to undertake even the most basic development activities.

Attracting qualified staff to work in the counties is a particularly persistent problem, as is the payment of staff salaries. In some cases county government staff are not on the government payroll, and where they are, salaries are often received late and sometimes not at all. In some cases county officials are not even based in the county for which they are responsible due to a lack of infrastructure – with obvious implications for their ability to understand their constituencies and provide services based on real needs.
Box 2: The non-payment of teacher salaries

Funds for county government salaries and operational costs are transferred as ‘conditional grants’ from the GoSS to state governments each month. The MoFEP has directed that upon receipt, the funds should be transferred immediately from state to county treasuries and reflected in county budgets. But this is resisted by some states, and in these cases, the funds are retained in state government treasuries.

Where conditional grants for county governments are retained by the state, salaries for county government staff should be transferred on a monthly basis from states to counties. In some cases salaries are transferred to county bank accounts; but where this is not possible (due to county authorities not having bank accounts), the cash is sent by road to the county. Information is then passed to civil servants – if possible by phone, but where this is not possible, then ‘manually’ – that salaries are ready for collection at the county headquarters. Civil servants then have a limited period to collect their salaries.

Teachers earn, on average, around 250 Sudanese pounds ($94) each month. For teachers located in, say, the border areas of Eastern Equatoria, travelling to county headquarters will likely cost around 150 Sudanese pounds ($56), plus one or two days away from families. Even where salaries do make it from state to county headquarters (often difficult in the rainy season), and even if the information does then reach the teacher, in many cases it is simply not feasible for staff to travel the distance to collect their salaries.63

Attracting staff to the counties and professionalising the payroll system are critical issues – but an even deeper and more difficult problem is the scarcity of qualified staff throughout the country. As explained by one Juba-based NGO staff, ‘some donors (and UN and NGOs) seem to think that if a project or activity is short of staff, then the answer is to hire additional educated people and provide a bit of role-specific training. But there simply aren’t enough qualified people around and any such hiring is a zero-sum game. If an NGO hires someone good, then that person isn’t available for the government, or if a state government hires someone good, then they’re probably depriving a county government of that person, and so on.’64 It is a fundamental challenge that has not yet been adequately addressed by government, donors or implementing agencies.

Recommendations

• Support the GoSS in its commitment to decentralising development, service delivery and governance. This should include: more substantial capacity building for state and county authorities; support for the GoSS to develop systems for ensuring that state governments are held accountable for funds received, and that county departments receive sufficient resources to carry out their assigned responsibilities as well as control over (and training to manage) their own budgets; and support for the development of safeguards to ensure equitable distribution to the states and counties.

‘There’s a school, but there are no real teachers. There are two volunteer teachers – they don’t receive a salary. Even if there is a school and there are students, you still need teachers there to give them knowledge. We’re worried that the teachers will get fed up and leave.’

Male community member, Jamam county, Upper Nile, May 2011.
• Provide more targeted support for initiatives aimed at addressing key capacity gaps at the county level. This should include: training, mentoring and technical support; provision of funds; provision of transport, office space and communications equipment; and support for the development of business management systems including human resources and payroll. Donors should adopt a harmonised, inter-agency approach, and the priorities, roles and responsibilities of different actors engaged in capacity building should be clearly defined.

• Continue to explore innovative solutions for increasing the number of qualified staff throughout the country. Possible initiatives could include: programs aimed at harnessing the skills of the diaspora; specialised internships; student or professional exchange programs within the region; and enhanced support for (and coordination of) technical and vocational education and training programs in South Sudanese institutions.
Allow sufficient time for transition

The SSDP calls for international donors to move away from ‘non-government aid’ and to channel their funds increasingly through government systems and institutions. In the long term, the government requests donors to provide assistance through ‘general budget support, sector budget support and project support’, and to provide ‘project support that is directly managed by GoSS’.65

The government’s desire to see development assistance channelled through government institutions is in line with good development practice, as reflected in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Fragile States Principles. In the context of South Sudan, however, it is essential that such a shift be based on a realistic assessment of the government’s capacity to manage aid funds in a manner that is transparent, accountable and most importantly ensures uninterrupted service delivery to the people of South Sudan.

The GoSS has not as yet had full responsibility for the management of any aid funds. The establishment of the World Bank-administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was a shift in this direction – however even in the case of the MDTF the procurement process has been only partially government-managed. And even with this arrangement, the inefficiencies of the fund – which failed to deliver timely assistance to the people of South Sudan – provide an indication of what can happen when transition is rushed.66 It’s in everyone’s interest to see the GoSS assume responsibility for the management of humanitarian and development assistance, but it won’t happen overnight.

NGOs are currently responsible for the delivery of an estimated 80 per cent of health services in South Sudan.67 As acknowledged by the GoSS, ‘if support is withdrawn, these services could collapse very quickly’68 – with disastrous implications for South Sudanese.

Evaluations have shown that technical projects implemented by experienced international agencies have been more effective than those driven by state building objectives or which ‘have to contend with divided or inefficient national structures’.69 With this in mind, it is essential that humanitarian and development assistance, channelled through and delivered by international aid agencies, be allowed to continue alongside efforts to build government institutions and capacity – with a view to creating an environment whereby development assistance can be wholly delivered through national institutions and systems in the years to come.

In addition to support for government institutions, the continuation of humanitarian and development assistance by and through international aid agencies will require developing and implementing an appropriate regulatory framework aimed at facilitating the work of NGOs. There is currently a lack of clarity regarding the bureaucratic requirements applicable to NGOs operating in South Sudan – including issues such as registration, taxes, work permit and visa requirements for

‘Phasing transitions from humanitarian aid is … an important part of transforming institutions. In countries where current stresses overwhelm national institutional capacity by a large margin, national reformers often draw on international humanitarian capacity to deliver early results. … a difficult trade-off occurs in deciding on the time needed to shift these functions to national institutions. … For health, education, water and sanitation, it means reducing international roles step by step over time as the capacity of national or local institutions increases…’

international staff and social insurance for national staff – and there is some concern that the operating environment could become more restrictive post-independence. Such a shift could jeopardise the critical role played by NGOs in the provision of humanitarian and development assistance – and particularly the delivery of basic services – to the people of South Sudan.

Recommendations

• Direct significant financial and technical resources towards building the capacity of government institutions, particularly the MoFEP, to manage aid funds; as well as the capacity of civil society to engage in the budget development process and to monitor government spending.

• Support the GoSS to establish benchmarks for determining whether national systems and institutions provide satisfactory assurance that government-managed aid brings maximum possible benefit to the people of South Sudan. Benchmarks should measure the government’s capacity to ensure transparent management of aid through an appropriate legislative framework, and to monitor and report on the use of funds. The passing of (and subsequent adherence to) the Public Financial Management Act, the Procurement Act and the Audit Act, and the roll-out of the Financial Information Management System across all states, provide examples of minimum benchmarks upon which such a transition could be based.

• Ensure that funding mechanisms for the delivery of basic services are designed so as to facilitate eventual transition to government management. External oversight must be retained, but governance arrangements should allow for a gradual increase in government involvement as benchmarks are met. The establishment of appropriate safeguards to mitigate fiduciary risk (and at the same time to strengthen public financial management systems) will be an important component of any such transition strategy.

• Recognise that the design of new funding mechanisms will take time. With current funds coming to an end and new mechanisms only in early stages of discussion, donors must ensure an uninterrupted flow of funds for basic services. In this regard, the proposed extension of the Basic Services Fund (BSF) is welcome, however the details of the extension must rapidly be finalised so as to ensure appropriate continuity of service delivery.

• Support the GoSS to develop and implement an appropriate regulatory framework for NGOs operating in South Sudan – aimed at facilitating, not restricting, the provision of humanitarian and development assistance. Such a framework should be informed by consultation with NGOs, and should clarify in particular: which government ministry is the primary interlocutor for NGOs; NGO registration requirements; immigration requirements for international staff and employment requirements for national staff; and applicable tax exemptions.
Provide timely, predictable funds

In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship and various other commitments to good practice, donors have explicitly recognised the importance of timely, predictable funding.\textsuperscript{72} This means that funding mechanisms must facilitate, not hinder, rapid intervention. But in South Sudan the converse has often been true, and the considerable delays encountered by agencies trying to access pooled funds have been well documented.\textsuperscript{73}

The slowest and most bureaucratic of the pooled funds has been the MDTF. At the end of 2009, four years after the establishment of the fund, donor contributions amounted to $526m. Of this, just $212.5 had been disbursed to partners and $190m actually spent. Performance in the health sector was particularly poor. The MDTF-funded multi-agency program for health sector development was supposed to deliver the government's Basic Package of Health Services to 37 counties across all states in South Sudan. Four years in, just three out of ten lead agent contracts were active and not a single subcontract had been signed nor dollar disbursed.\textsuperscript{74}

The effectiveness of the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) has been similarly hampered by disbursement delays. CHF grants run from January through December, but funds are not normally disbursed to NGOs until the end of the dry season (April/May) – leaving just a few months for project implementation and making it almost impossible for partners to synchronise activities with the seasonal calendar. Some NGOs are able to pre-finance activities, but this is impossible for many of the smaller agencies, who must wait for funds to arrive before commencing implementation. This experience is reflected in OCHA's own evaluation of the CHF, which found that ‘the calendar-year basis of funding creates particular difficulty in South Sudan where funding can come too late both for the purchase of seeds and tools for the rainy season, and for construction', and that ‘in practice the period of time available to NGOs to implement projects is no longer than seven months'.\textsuperscript{75}

It's not just that implementation is interrupted by the rainy season, but that good development and even humanitarian assistance in protracted crises takes time. It takes time to assess the context and introduce a project to communities, time to facilitate community participation, time to build community capacity to maintain a project, and time to monitor to see if it's working and take corrective action if it's not. As described by one NGO staff in Upper Nile, 'a committee only works once you get to a certain level of understanding. It needs a lot of work. If you just provide the training but then don't follow up, you get nothing'.\textsuperscript{76}

Box 3: The implications of short term funding – rehabilitation of hand pumps and boreholes in South Sudan

‘Many NGOs drill boreholes and install hand pumps, and then a year later when the pumps have stopped working, they get more funding to repair them. Some NGOs have annual hand pump rehabilitation programs. Rehabilitation is standard in emergency response, but when it’s such a focus in development programs – that’s a problem. It undermines government structures, it’s expensive, and it’s all because the job isn’t getting done properly in the first place. What’s needed is community water management committees with the capacity and the drive to maintain the pumps, but this is almost impossible to set up in a year, which is normally all you’ve got, or just six months if you take out the rainy season. The government needs to be involved, there needs to be a proper community selection process, and the structure needs to be discussed and agreed. To have a reasonable chance of success, you’d need a year of planning, followed by a year of hands-on work in the community, followed by another year of monitoring and support. This could be done using a phased approach – starting with one county for the first year, then continuing to work with that county in the second year while at the same time doing preliminary work in the next one. But the whole thing would need to be part of a three to five year program.’

Oxfam Public Health Coordinator, Juba, May 2011

Recommendations:

• Recognise that in a context as complex as South Sudan, effective response requires a range of funding mechanisms; and that this includes substantial bilateral funds channelled directly to implementing agencies, which multiple evaluations have found provide the most timely, effective response to crisis affected populations.77

• Ensure that the design of a new CHF for South Sudan takes into account lessons learnt during the CPA interim period. Specifically, the delayed disbursement of funds, short implementation periods and lack of synchronisation with the seasonal calendar must be addressed. This could be achieved by extending the duration of CHF projects (and the humanitarian work-plan) from one to two years, but with multiple openings during each period (two – three openings annually); and aligning the CHF funding schedule with the seasonal calendar. Donors should where possible make multi-year commitments so that the allocations process is not held up due to uncertainties over available funds, and should ensure that funds are committed well before the start of the project year.78 Donors should also work with OCHA and the UNDP to streamline the allocations process so as to ensure that funds are disbursed before, not after, projects are due to commence.

• Ensure that future pooled funds are designed with a view to facilitating timely response. Management agents must be selected on the basis of clear criteria including past performance (noting that

‘The Basic Services Fund (BSF) works exceptionally well. They’re professional, functional, well managed. They have monitoring teams with specialists who really know what they’re talking about. They keep us on our toes – it’s actually nice to be held accountable like that.’

NGO staff, Western Equatoria, June 2011.
pooled funds managed by private contractors are widely regarded as having performed better than World Bank and UN-managed funds\(^7\); and whoever the management agent, governance arrangements must be designed so as to allow timely disbursement of funds.

- ‘Stay engaged long enough to give success a chance’.\(^8\) Addressing the development challenges in South Sudan is a gargantuan task that will be slow and fraught with difficulty. While humanitarian funding will be required for some time to come, the future aid architecture must also ensure adequate long-term (multi-year) development funding including at the project level.
Throughout the CPA interim period, humanitarian and development assistance in South Sudan has in large part consisted of single sector interventions, in many cases focused on the symptoms of a problem rather than addressing what is almost always a multiplicity of underlying causes. This is perhaps attributable to the multitude of challenges and complexities that have been described throughout this paper: an ever-changing context that fails to sit neatly in a humanitarian, recovery or development box; an enormously challenging operating environment; and the difficulty of understanding the drivers and dynamics of the conflict.

The limitations of this single sector approach are illustrated by the international effort to address malnutrition. Interventions in the ‘nutrition sector’ have primarily focused on treatment – stabilisation centres, community therapeutic care, etc. But malnutrition has a multiplicity of causes: poor water, sanitation and hygiene, poor infant and child feeding practices, lack of dietary diversity, and inadequate access to primary health care. If a program targets only one or two of these underlying causes, then the results of the positive initiatives that are taking place will likely be undermined by a lack of intervention in other, related sectors. While the humanitarian situation in South Sudan has generally improved throughout the CPA interim period, the prevalence rates of acute malnutrition have remained persistently high.

Ensuring integrated programming is the responsibility of both donors and implementing agencies. As acknowledged by one staff member in Juba, ‘it’s not just the donors – we leap every time donor funding...’
comes up. We should have a good five year plan that we take to the
donors and then seek funding for that. Some NGOs are doing just
this, however, and are finding themselves running up against the
reality of an aid architecture that is largely geared towards the
provision of single-sector, project-based funding. Consequently, many
NGOs are utilising multiple funding streams (with funds sometimes
originating from the same donor but via different administrative
agents) to support sub-projects of what should be one coherent
program. The problem – and its implications – is illustrated by World
Vision’s experiences with the piloting of its Area Rehabilitation
Program model, described below.

<table>
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<th>Box 4: World Vision’s Area Rehabilitation Program</th>
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| The ARP is a fragile states programming model that seeks to allow World Vision national offices to address the multiple dimensions of poverty in an integrated manner through multi-sectoral interventions. ‘Start-up funding’ is provided by World Vision affiliates so as to allow participatory program assessment and design, and the hope is that the individual projects will then be funded by institutional donors. World Vision affiliates provide core funding so as to allow basic management structures and program quality functions to remain in place. Two years into the piloting of the ARP model, a monitoring report from one of the supporting affiliates described the challenges as follows:

*It is a concern that there seems to be no immediate prospect of funding for any of the projects within the ARP other than the project that [World Vision affiliate] has agreed to fund. The idea of the ARP is that it allows a national office to comprehensively assess the needs in a given area, and to design a multi-sectoral program to address those needs. But the reality is that unless funding is assured for the whole program at the outset, we are in a position of still having to respond to calls from donors, and picking out components of the ARP and tailoring those components to meet the donor’s criteria (or possibly designing a new project altogether in order to qualify for funds). Inevitably this means that the projects will be at least a little bit donor-driven, and this then brings us back to the very position that the ARPs are trying to get us away from. The Adolescent Girls Initiative proposal (not originally included in the ARP but designed subsequently in response to a World Bank call for proposals) and the Sudan Emergency Recovery Fund proposal (which covers some components of the education project but not those prioritised in the assessment) illustrate this reality.

Perhaps more importantly, the possibility of some projects designed as part of the ARP not going ahead has the potential to negatively impact upon the likelihood of the projects that are funded meeting their objectives. The ARP concept note states that ‘experience has shown that if a programme deals with only a single sector or issue, or if a programme does not take into account the different dimensions of poverty, outcomes are unlikely to affect root causes of poverty.’ The point is that while the ARP model facilitates the design of a program that comprehensively addresses identified needs, if the reality is that the projects may not all be funded and may in fact end up having to be implemented largely as independent projects – then those independent projects may as well have been designed from the outset as stand-alone projects, rather than as part of an integrated program that may or may not occur.*
'Integrated programming' means programming that is not only multi-sectoral (thus addressing the multiple dimensions of poverty), but that allows for an appropriate transition from humanitarian relief, through recovery, to development. But the challenges for coordination are significant. Some donors have indicated that beyond next year they will be narrowing the sectoral focus of their funding strategies (in the interest of developing greater sectoral expertise with a view to ensuring program quality), and the establishment of single-sector pooled funds (such as a pooled fund for health) is being discussed. Additionally, many donors provide either ‘humanitarian’ or ‘development’ funding – when in fact the lines between the two are not easily drawn. As explained by one humanitarian donor, "too often we get to the end of the project, and as far as our mandate’s concerned, our job’s done. We’ve saved lives. But it doesn’t mean we can just leave. But often there’s no one to hand over to."85

Recommendations

• Ensure that funding mechanisms are sufficiently broad and sufficiently flexible to support holistic, integrated programming – meaning programming that is based on needs assessments, multi-sectoral, and that allows for appropriate transition from relief to development. This could be achieved through bilateral multi-sectoral funding, or through bilateral or multilateral funding to multiple implementing agencies. What matters is not the mechanism but the result: programming that addresses the various dimensions of poverty and ensures no gap in coverage between humanitarian relief and development.

• Recognise that this will require substantially improved donor coordination: between donors operating in different sectors, and between humanitarian relief and development donors, including the humanitarian and development offices of the same donor.86 Donor participation in the clusters, and more coordinated discussion regarding gaps in coverage and where the responsibilities of the various donors begin and end, could go a long way towards enabling a smoother handover of projects and programs.
Conclusion

Following substantial sums in international aid and sustained attention by both humanitarian and development actors in the six years since the signing of the CPA, the humanitarian situation in South Sudan has improved. As explained by one county authority in Upper Nile, ‘before the CPA, this town was a war zone. It was very hard even for people to cross borders between the payams. Now there are boreholes, some bomas have schools built by NGOs and one by government, and they’re being used, and basic services are starting to reach to the outlying areas.’ It is a sentiment shared by a number of communities across the country. But enormous challenges remain, and in light of the prevailing political, security, climatic and economic conditions alluded to throughout this paper, the development gains that have been made could easily be reversed.

The potential for promoting pro-poor growth and sustainable livelihoods for the citizens of the new Republic of South Sudan is vast. And with the government and almost all donors revising their aid strategies in the early days of independence, now is the time to ensure that the country’s new aid architecture builds on lessons learnt from the past, adheres to the principles of good humanitarian donorship and development best practice and delivers the maximum possible benefit to the people of South Sudan. In the post-independence period, this will require donors to: appropriately balance long term development assistance with humanitarian response; understand and address the conflict dynamics; pay greater attention to the need to involve communities and strengthen civil society; ensure that humanitarian and development assistance is equitably distributed; prioritise the most vulnerable and ensure social protection; promote pro-poor, sustainable livelihoods; strengthen government capacity, with particular attention to the County level; ensure an appropriately phased transition; provide timely, flexible and long-term funds; and support multi-sectoral, holistic programming.

Donors, the GoSS, implementing agencies and most importantly the people of South Sudan have a lot at stake – but much more to gain. Success will require substantial resources and long-term commitment, a willingness to think ‘outside the box’ (and outside normal humanitarian and development paradigms), and above all a commitment to reflecting on and learning from experience – good and bad – during the CPA interim period.
Notes


2 For under-five mortality, access to safe drinking water and maternal mortality, see UNDP, Status of MDGs in Sudan in 2010 (2011) <http://www.sd.undp.org/mdg_fact.htm>. The maternal mortality rate (MMR) in South Sudan in 2010 according to UNDP statistics was 1,989 deaths per 100,000 live births. According to World Health Organisation statistics, the country with the next highest MMR, based on 2008 data, is Afghanistan with a MMR of 1400: World Health Organisation, Global Health Observatory Data Repository (2011) <http://apps.who.int/ghodata/?vid=240>. For statistics on poverty, female literacy and child immunization see Southern Sudan Centre for Census Statistics and Evaluation, ‘Key Indicators for Southern Sudan’ (December 2010). For comparison between a girl dying from pregnancy related causes and finishing school, see Federal Ministry of Health, Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, Southern Sudan Ministry of Health and South Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, ‘The Sudan Household Health Survey’ (October 2007). For statistic on access to health facilities, see the UN in Sudan, ‘Helping South Sudan during its First Two Years’ (presentation by Lise Grande, July 2011).


4 Email correspondence from UN OCHA, Juba, 29 July 2011.

5 UN OCHA, ‘Cumulative Figures of New Conflict Related Displacement reported in 2011 – Status 15/07/11: 273,999 IDPs’ (15 July 2011).


7 Interview with senior NGO staff, Juba, May 2011. In May this year, over 110,000 people fled their homes in a matter of weeks when fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the SPLA in the disputed border region of Abyei: UN OCHA, ‘South Sudan Weekly Humanitarian Bulletin 24-30 June 2011’ (2011).

8 See J Bennett et al, ‘Aiding the Peace: A Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010’ (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010), 86 (noting that the ‘chronic lack of livelihoods and employment opportunities for youth was highlighted by many … as having a much more direct potential for creating or exacerbating tensions than the lack of basic services’).


10 Bennett et al, above n 8, 51.


13 According to the Government of Southern Sudan “Western Equatoria State is known for its natural resources and for being the bread basket of South Sudan.” SSDDR website: <http://www.ssddrc.org/state/15-western-equatoria.html>. Also see Rescuing the Peace (Oxfam): “With its fertile soils and relatively educated population, this should have been one of the first states in southern Sudan to thrive after the CPA. Instead, some communities are too frightened to stay in their villages or venture into the fields to cultivate. As a result, rural school enrolment has declined, and normally productive farming families are going hungry.” Oxfam interviews with state government authorities, church leaders and LRA-affected communities, Yambio, Western Equatoria, 13–20 October 2009.

14 According to The Livelihood Analysis Forum (LAF) considers Western Equatoria state to be at an acute food and livelihood crisis situation, as a result of LRA attacks: “The Lord’s Resistant Army (LRA) has recently intensified attacks on local communities especially in the central and western parts of the State. This has again disrupted livelihoods and caused fresh displacement. This is expected to overshadow agricultural activities and thus have negative impact on households’ food availability and access. Currently, there is general food insecurity with the non-displaced persons feeding from their own production reserves and the displaced/returnees receiving food aid” <http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/sifsia/docs/Food %20Security %20Update May June.pdf>. See also, Ghosts of Christmas Past (Oxfam, 2010): “As one of the most fertile and relatively stable states in southern Sudan, Western Equatoria should have thrived following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Instead, insecurity and mass movements of people fleeing their homes in fear of attack have devastated otherwise self-
sufficient farming communities and significantly hampered attempts to deliver desperately needed humanitarian aid.” page 9.

15 The World Bank, above n 12, 6.
16 Bennett et al, above n 8, 115-6.
17 Interviews with NGO staff in Juba, Western Equatoria and Upper Nile, May-June 2011.
19 Interview with NGO staff, Jamam county, Upper Nile, May 2011.
20 For a discussion of the difficulties faced by national NGOs in accessing pooled funds see Southern Sudan NGO Forum, ‘National NGO Access to Pooled Funds’ (May 2011).
22 For an excellent model for building the capacity of local communities to engage with and advocate to local authorities see Keren Winterford, ‘Citizen Voice and Action Guidance Notes’ (World Vision, January 2009).
24 Interviews with NGO staff, Juba, May-June 2011.
25 See GoSS, ‘Fragile States Survey’, above n 11, which notes that ‘the issue of balancing donor support across states and counties is … critical with implications for peacebuilding and statebuilding’ (at 15).
26 Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (2011) art 168(5).
27 The projected populations for Jonglei and Western Bahr el Gazal in 2011 are 1.5m and 367,535 respectively. In 2010, Jonglei had a food insecure population of 570,000, while Western Bahr el Gazal had a food insecure population of 96,000: Annual Needs and Livelihoods Analysis Technical Group, above n 6, 6.
30 Annual Needs and Livelihoods Analysis Technical Group, above n 6, 6.
31 See ibid 7 (found that six per cent of South Sudanese households engaged in ‘medium to high level adverse coping strategies’, and nearly a quarter of all households reduced the number and/or size of their meals at some stage during 2010).
32 Famine Early Warning Systems Network, ‘Sudan Food Security Alert’ (July 2011).
33 See Ellen Martin, ‘Gender, Violence and Survival in Juba, Southern Sudan’ (Humanitarian Policy Group, November 2010)
34 South Sudan Protection Cluster, ‘Rapid Needs Assessment: Data Analysis’ (June 2011), 40.
36 Ibid 14.
38 See UK Department for International Development (DFID), ‘Cash Transfers’ (Evidence Paper, Policy Division, 2011) ii (noting that experience from around the world, including sub-Saharan Africa, affirm that cash transfers can lead to increased school enrolment and increased use of health services).
40 See DFID, above n 38, 59; EU Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) and European University Institute, ‘Social Protection for Inclusive Development: A New Perspective in EU Cooperation with Africa’ (European Report on Development, 2010) 6.
42 See DFID, above n 38, vii.
43 Ibid ii.
See, for example, the American Refugee Committee’s program in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, which provides an integrated package of services to survivors of gender-based violence.


Annual Needs and Livelihoods Analysis Technical Group, above n 6, x-xi.

Interview with man in Nanziri village, Western Equatoria, June 2011; see also Annual Needs and Livelihoods Analysis Technical Group, above n 6, x.

World Food Program, ‘Emergency Food Security Assessment for Returnees in South Sudan’ (February 2011) 5.

Ibid 5.

See Bennett et al, above n 8, 81 and South Sudan Protection Cluster, above n 34, 10. The South Sudan Development Plan also recognises that ‘in a development strategy which seeks to enable the small scale agriculture sector, clarification of property rights and land tenure, including for women farmers, is crucial’: GoSS, ‘Economic Development Pillar’ in South Sudan Development Plan (Draft, April 2011) 7.


Interview with community member, Nanziri, Yambio county, Western Equatoria, June 2011.

Interview with YAFA, Yambio county, Western Equatoria, June 2011.


Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011, art 168(8).

Local Government Act 2009 (South Sudan), Appendix II, Schedule I(1).

See GoSS, ‘Fragile States Survey’, above n 11, 8; Bennett et al, above n 8, 67.

GoSS, ‘Medium Term Capacity Building Strategy’ in South Sudan Development Plan (Draft 2, May 2011) 15.

Interviews with government officials and UN staff, Juba, Upper Nile and Western Equatoria, May-June 2011. See also Southern Sudan NGO Forum, ‘Governance Capacity Building at County Level’ (May 2011) (paper based on a desk-based study of 62 county government institutions, across 42 counties across all 10 states, December – March 2011).

See Southern Sudan NGO Forum, ‘Governance Capacity Building at County Level’ (May 2011).

Interviews with government officials and UN staff, Juba, Upper Nile and Western Equatoria, May–June 2011.

Email correspondence from NGO staff, Juba, June 2011.

GoSS, Draft Aid Strategy for the Government of South Sudan (March 2011) 14-5.

For a detailed critique of the MDTF see Wendy Fenton, ‘Funding Mechanisms in Southern Sudan: NGO Perspectives’ (February 2008) at 18-19.


GoSS, ‘Fragile States Survey’, above n 11, 8.

Bennett et al, above n 8, 132.

See also the The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (adopted at the 1st High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Paris, 28 February - 2 March 2005) (‘Paris Declaration’) principle 17, which provides that ‘using a country’s own institutions and systems, where these provide assurance that aid will be used for agreed purposes, increases aid effectiveness…’


See Fenton, above n 66; Southern Sudan NGO Forum, ‘Pooled Funds and Management Agents’ (March 2011); Bennett et al, above n 8, 72.
Bennett et al, above n 8, 72-3. On the inefficiencies of the MDTF, see also the World Bank, above n 12, 203. The World Bank took steps to improve the fund’s management, and disbursements reached a total of $400m by December 2010 – almost three quarters of the funds committed.


Interview with NGO staff, Upper Nile, May 2011.

Bennett et al, above n 8, 133; Fenton, above n 66, 12-39.

Similar recommendations were made in OCHA’s evaluation of Common Humanitarian Funds in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Sudan: see Goyder, above n 75, 6.

See Southern Sudan NGO Forum, ‘Pooled Funds and Management Agents’ (March 2011); Bennett et al, above n 8, 71.

Fragile States Principles art 9. See also the World Bank, above n 12, which states that ‘longer life project cycles is vital, given the timelines for institutional transformations, even under the most accelerated conditions’ (at 196).


Interview with senior NGO staff, Juba, May 2011.

Southern Sudan NGO Forum, ‘Financing of NGOs’ (March 2011) 3.

Interview with donor representative, Juba, June 2011.

A similar recommendation was made in OCHA’s CHF evaluation, which recommended ‘a need for stronger linkages between the CHF and other MDTF’s concerned with Recovery’: Goyder, above n 75, 5.

Interview with county government official, Marban County, Upper Nile, May 2011.